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| The Return of History and the End of Dreams | 
 enlarge | Author: Robert Kagan
Publisher: Knopf
Category: Book
List Price: $19.95
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Avg. Customer Rating:  33 reviews
Sales Rank: 6514
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 128
Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.6
Dimensions (in): 7.6 x 5.4 x 0.7
ISBN: 030726923X
Dewey Decimal Number: 327.1
EAN: 9780307269232
ASIN: 030726923X
Publication Date: April 29, 2008
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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| Customer Reviews:
 Good Observation, Inadequate Vision June 9, 2008
16 out of 23 found this review helpful
Robert Kagan deserves credit for recognizing certain realities. The world remains complicated and dangerous more than a decade after the Soviet Union fell. Nationalism and religious fanaticism remain. Many people now doubt the merits of Globalization. Francis Fukuyama erred in predicting the end of history back then, though I don't see that Kagan is really attacking Fukuyama, other than in the title. Clinton also erred in declaring an end to the era of big government. We are not on a deterministic path to democratic capitalism.
Somebody needed to write this book. The fact of the matter is that democracy and capitalism were historicaly uncommon forms of social organization back when the USSR keeled over. The same is true today. Of course, one can still argue that people are better off with capitalism and democracy. This is why somebody needs to write another book. Kagan is no visionary. He makes many observations about the way things are, and that is fine. But it is more important to think about how things could and should be.
To put it simply, excessive focus on the way the world is kills any chance for progress. Of course, the pursuit of unrealizable goals led to the disasters of the 20th century. But I do not think that the global order envisioned by Fukuyama (and by Hayek) has been proven unrealizable. Perhaps Kagan should now turn his attention to how we might avoid the international conflict and tension that he correctly observes. This is not to say that he has no opinions to offer. But he does not offer any sort of fundamental change to deal with the situations he observes. His call for world democracies to unite against autocracies could be as much a source for escalation of global problems as a cure. Perhaps we should not give up on dreaming just yet.
 A snapshot of global politics, 2008 June 1, 2008
14 out of 17 found this review helpful
Although the title clearly references Fukuyama's book, it's important to point out that Kagan isn't attacking Fukuyama here. Just in the same way that The End of History was a product of the end of the Cold War, The Return of History is the product of the world in 2008. Kagan's book is much less ambitious in the sense that Fukuyama really went out on a limb with his book and made a lot of predictions. While the fall of the Soviet Union undoubtedly remains one of history's most monumental events, time has not been kind to Fukuyama's argument.
The central thesis to Kagan's book is that great power politics and nationalistic ambitions did not die with the Soviet Union. Russia under Putin, China, and other autocracies stand opposite the U.S., Europe and other democracies in a struggle for dominance of the international system. Making a reference to Huntington, Kagan argues it is not a country's "civilization" that determines its path, but rather its form of government. Russia and China reach out to and reinforce autocratic governments regardless of where in the world they are, just as many East European and Asian democracies align themselves with the U.S. and Europe.
In just over 100 pages, Kagan produces a spot-on analysis of the world in mid-2008. He doesn't offer up sweeping predictions or theories, but rather a snapshot of sorts. One of the most interesting aspects of this book is looking at how Kagan's thinking has evolved since his last brief book, Of Paradise and Power. In that book, he spoke of the differences between the U.S. and Europe that were very pronounced during the lead up to the Iraq war. It's clear that Kagan is capable of providing informed and relevant analysis of world events as they constantly change. I'll be sure to read anything he produces in the future.
The Malignity of Multipolarity July 18, 2008
11 out of 11 found this review helpful
This is a perceptive and far-sighted examination on the state of global politics as the decade approaches its end, in the form of an extended essay. A new axis of evil is rising in opposition to the West, one not guided by a shared ideology except in so far as hostility to the rule of law and democracy might be considered ideological. Kagan predicts that the future will see the return of nationalism, growing tensions and confrontation between the forces of democracy and autocracy. What matters is a nation's nature of government, he observes, not its culture, religion or geographic location; and this will determine its international alignment. While not dismissing the terrorist threat, he does not consider it a primary menace as history proves that modernity has never lost against the traditionalism represented by the Islamists. True, but terrorism might have unintended consequences in the formation of alliances and the development of state structures.
It is interesting to compare Kagan's analysis with Margaret Thatcher's Statecraft, published in 2002, in which she assessed the state of the world and possible future trajectories. In chapters 3 and 4 of her book Thatcher looks at Russia and the Asian Giants China (including Taiwan and Hong Kong) and India. Rogue states, religion and terrorism are discussed in chapter 6, with particular reference to North Korea, Islam, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Iran. Another must-read: The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West by Edward Lucas, already confirms Kagan's view. Russia is pursuing policies that threaten its own citizens, neighboring states and the world at large. Lucas takes a hard look at the ruling elite which emerged almost entirely from the ranks of the old KGB. This dominant class harbors resentment against the West as a whole in an interesting parallel to the hostility of the Brussels Eurocracy towards the USA and Israel. The Russian government now openly competes with the West on the economic and political fronts.
Freedom of expression and the rule of law exist in name only; the state controls all the economic activity, political institutions and media that matter. Putin's term "managed" or "sovereign" democracy really means a malignant form of Czarism. Despite Russia's demographic implosion, pervasive corruption and widespread lawlessness, a new cold war is being waged. Not only has the country displayed thuggish behavior against Ukraine, Moldova, Estonia, Georgia and the UK in the Litvinenko case, it is supplying arms to rogue states Iran and Syria and their terrorist proxies Hamas and Hezbollah. Anna Politkovskaya's A Russian Diary: A Journalist's Final Account of Life, Corruption, and Death in Putin's Russia exposes the mentality and incompetence of the ruling class.
The geopolitical implications are staggering, as the Putin gang eagerly befriends all enemies of the West. Evidence is accumulating that Russia seeks an alliance with the Islamic world and a partial restoration of the Soviet Empire through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) of which China is a member. The Kremlin ignores the long-term threat from China despite the particularly drastic demographic and infrastructural implosion in Russia's Far East. Whatever other evils follow from Russia's abandonment of Western values, it is sure to become a more barbaric society for its citizens and a considerably more dangerous international player. One may confidently expect it to supply Iran with nuclear weapons technology and to support every loathsome thugocracy that defiles the planet.
Russia is pursuing an energy policy aimed at strangling the liberal democracies by e.g. establishing a gas cartel. An expanded SCO that includes Iran, other Middle Eastern and African states like Libya and Sudan, plus Venezuela is a real possibility. Kagan correctly identifies it as a revived Warsaw Pact. The SCO will lock the Turkic speaking states of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (plus Persian Tajikistan) firmly in the bear's embrace. The future role of Turkey will be crucial; it remains to be seen how its current pro-religious government will adapt its foreign policy as reaction to the country's certain exclusion from the European inner core. Economic ties to Europe are of course assured but the country might significantly upgrade relations with the Central Asian states and the SCO.
Kagan foresees closer future ties between the USA, India and Japan, rather than a larger role for NATO. Echoing the idea expressed in The UN and Beyond: United Democratic Nations (edited by Anne Bayefsky), Kagan proposes the same type of international organization consisting of democratic states co-coordinating their policies. Perhaps he underestimates the ambition of the Brussels Eurocracy and its resentment of the US. The likelihood of all 27 states uniting is slim, but prospects for closer union of a core group including Germany, France, the Benelux countries, Italy, Spain and a few others are bright. Such a restructuring could be triggered by many factors like the refusal of current member states to relinquish further sovereignty, economic problems or security concerns. While retaining nominal autonomy, the other countries of Europe will undoubtedly accept the Superstate's foreign policy. The loss of the UK will diminish the Anglosphere whilst an alliance with India and Japan might formidably enhance its influence and assure its strategic advantage of continued dominance over three of the world's oceans.
One fact is certain: the USA follows the siren calls of isolationism at its great peril. And the paranoids that tried to demonize the "Hyperpower" will look back on the period of American "hegemony" with affection and nostalgia once the dynamics of the new multipolar world become clear. What distinguishes Kagan's conclusions from the discredited popular notions of the 90s - Fukuyama's fatuous futurology and Huntington's culturally based theory - is that elements of it have already begun to unfold. How comfortable the decade of the Clintons now seems in comparison to contemporary trends. Kagan's book is alarming and unsettling but a much needed tonic for identifying, and preparing for, the coming challenges.
Yesterday's News, Oversimplified! May 18, 2008
10 out of 20 found this review helpful
We were all supposed to live happily ever after following the end of the Cold War. However, instead leading powers are once again competing for power, raising the possibility of conflict. In addition, radical Islamists are waging a violent struggle against those believed to have dominated and polluted their world. Kagan believes that the most important question facing liberal democratic countries is to choose whether they want to participate in shaping the future.
Kagan then provides short segments addressing the activities of Russia, China, India, Japan, and the U.S. Clearly Russia is using its oil to rebuild its military (20% growth for each of the last three years), rebuild its citizens standards of living, and rebuild its influence (eg. staging forces near Georgia's border, threatening various former satellites with the cutoff of energy, and railing against efforts to expand NATA into its immediately adjacent lands. China, on the other hand, is committed to raising the standard of living for its people through increased trade in manufactured goods; at the same time it is also building its military (10%/year for the last ten years) and global influence through assistance given to energy-rich nations. Kagan also points out that Taiwan is a particularly intense focus of nationalistic irritation and a potential flash point.
One problem with "The Return of History" is that it is written through a nationalistic U.S. view - downplaying or ignoring our problems with a declining currency, rising debts, and inability to effectively resolve relations with Iran, Pakistan and much of the Islamic world, or even progress in the "War on Terror" (WOT). (Kagan does, however, point out that our alliance with China and Russia in the WOT are largely illusionary as they are focused on different problems than the U.S.)
Any report on the increasing competitiveness between major powers should examine basic questions and likely scenarios. Ever wonder why the U.S. is the primary player in the WOT? Or what would happen within China if the U.S. took a more protectionist trade position, or within the U.S. if China et al stopped buying U.S. government bonds? Or the likelihood of Russia AND China standing behind Iran, in pursuit of its oil and military spending, thus thwarting our aims in Iraq and the M.E.? Or whether more democracy is as good as Kagan believes? (It certainly has led to problems (government paralysis, the excessive role of special interest groups, government by sound-bite, etc. in the U.S., and brought major abuses in Russia pre-Putin as well.) How long can the U.S. support WOT costs at all levels of government, plus our military? What would the imipact be if Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, and Russia refused to sell oil to the U.S.? Kagan doesn't explore such issues, and thus seriously weakens the book.
The best part about "The Return of History" is that it is short and easily read.
good crash course May 17, 2008
8 out of 13 found this review helpful
Kagan basically gives a quick 100 page overview of the current geopolitical scene. He writes that the idealistic post Cold War period is over and it's belief in a world without geopolitical tension was naive. He states the world is moving more and more into two camps, autocratic states (Russia, China, Iran, Burma, North Korea) vs. liberal states (U.S., E.U., Japan,). This is a very good book for someone who wants to know what is going on around the world without reading some 500 page boring book.
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