Today we judge the value of every idea, institution, and individual by one test: is it popular? Or, more practically, do the majority of those polled like it? This transformation has affected not just politics but also business, law, culture, and even religion. Every institution and profession in society must democratize or die. Democracy has gone from being a form of government to a way of life.

Like any broad transformation, however, the trends that democracy unleashes are not uniformly benign. Democracy has its dark sides, yet to question it has been to provoke instant criticism that you are "out of sync" with the times. No more. With an easy command of history, philosophy, and current affairs, Zakaria reinterprets our past and outlines our future. Woodrow Wilson said the challenge of the twentieth century was to make the world safe for democracy. This penetrating book challenges us to make democracy safe for the world.

This book is a remarkable guide to the major challenges, both foreign and domestic, that face America in the twenty-first century. The thesis of this book is essentially that too much democratization and decentralization, two notions that are often hailed as universally good, can be disasterous. This argument is not new, as Dr. Zakaria readily admits. What is new is the contextualization of these problems to the modern world.

The author brilliantly analyzes both foreign and domestic policy through the prism of what he calls "Illiberal Democracy." The analysis is both lucid and cogent, and it is remarkable how much insight exists on every page. Dr. Zakaria is a polymath with prodigious analytical ability, and, as a result, both knowledge and sagacity ooze off the page.

The book ranges from topic to topic, yet still remains coherent. Dr. Zakaria ranges from topics such as Islamic Fundamentalism, to the decline of Congressional presitige on the national political stage, to the virtual disintigration of good governence in the state of California. Despite his reputation as a foreign policy maven, his analysis of domestic affairs is also brilliant:

"The deregulation of democracy has gone too far ... although [sic] none would dare speak ill of present-day democracy, most people instinctively sense a problem ... More intriguingly, in poll after poll, when Americans are asked what public institutions they most respect, three bodies are always at the top of their list: the Supreme Court, the armed forces, and the Federal Reserve. All three have one thing in common: they are insulated from public pressures and operate undemocratically."

One aspect of this book that might grate on American sensibilities is the unabashedly proelite stance this book takes. It serves as almost a rallying cry to the elite to save the institutions that save the commoners from themselves. Although that description may be overexaggerated, undoubtedly this book laments for the halcyon days of a socially-responsible elite in America. However, in the end a lot of this analysis seems correct.

Despite this slight misgiving, this is a brilliant book that provides an intellectual framework for many of problems facing Americans in the twenty-first century, ranging from the scourge of mass terrorism to the cultural malaise here at home.

*****


The Future of a New Political Discourse   April 4, 2003
 100 out of 108 found this review helpful

America has been fortunate in the last fifty years to have had brilliant authors plotting both the possible and plausible courses of her foreign policy. There are few seminal works though - ones that somehow palpably alter the structures within which everything we consider must necessarily be examined. After Sir Winston's Churchill's warnings of an Iron Curtain descending across Europe, we were given the equally prophetic George F. Kennan who wrote his famous article in Foreign Affairs. As the decades clicked by and liberal democracy seemed to progress unchecked, Francis Fukuyama presented his "The End of History and the Last Man." Another decade sped by, and as globalization and interdependence became the focus for international theory academics, pundits, and practitioners alike, Samuel P. Huntington alerted the world to another problem in his "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" (again first printed in Foreign Affairs). More recently we've been given Robert Kagan's "Of Paradise and Power," which, while it certainly puts the trans-Atlantic relationship in perspective for us, the world remains a bit hazy. This is especially true if one considers that neither Huntington nor Fukuyama has been unequivocally disproved; and hence, the world seems all the more complex.

Hence, Fareed Zakaria arrives on the doorstep of our minds, and like those before him, offers his book as a substitute for a crystal ball. Indeed, Dr. Zakaria has received favorable reviews by Huntington, which accurately note that this is a study that hasn't been articulated since Aristotle and Tocqueville. The major premise is this: unregulated democracy undermines liberty and the rule of law. There are a plethora of parallels to be drawn from this domestically (e.g. Benjamin Barber and Don Eberly), or internationally (e.g. Robert Kaplan, Robert Keegan, etc). "The Future of Freedom" will prove to be a profoundly troubling book for those who believe democracy flourishes anywhere it is planted or whatever culture it is grafted onto, and for those who believe democracy is synonymous with freedom. This is a very old argument, one that finds itself centered in political philosophy, and Zakaria's book is all the more important because of its timeliness, and because, even as it is an old argument, it is one that has never reconciled the individual with society, or freedom with duty.

This book will be important to the student especially - whether they read it or not, it will shape the discussions and debates they engage in. They would be better prepared by understanding it. Academics, though many verge on becoming synonymous with abstract and impractical philologasters, will likely also find it the counter-weight to their own, more liberal ideas. Policy makers should read it because I can only presume that it will inform closed-door discussions on whether illiberal democracy abroad is better than no democracy at all. Many books inform us as to where we have been, a few, quickly written texts tell us where we are in greater depth than do newspapers or magazines; however, Mr. Zakaria's text is one of the elite few that manages to show us where we might be going.


Democracy, the insidious threat   April 23, 2003
 99 out of 128 found this review helpful

Fareed Zakaria is an intellectual whose time has come. Handsome, foreign-born, a possible candidate for the first Muslim Secretary of State, he has the sort of cachet the mass media love. His only problem is that he is a shallow conventional thinker with nothing intelligent to say. But that isn't really a problem for American journalism. The United States is a country where you can say anything you want. But being listened to, if you are to the left of Michael Kinsley or Robert Kerry, is another thing entirely. In the absence of real debate we have pseudo-debate and here Zakaria can shine. His thesis is that we are threatened with too much democracy. Rich and wealthy businessmen do not have sufficient power to insulate themselves and the world economic system from democratic pressure. It's an appalling injustice. Zakaria does not put his argument quite like that. Instead he argues that while Americans naturally wish to encourage free elections in the world, those free elections have the unfortunate habit of electing people like Yeltsin, Putin and Chavez. They would probably elect all sorts of nasty fundamentalists in the Middle East if those countries deigned to have elections. What these countries need is not more democracy, but more liberal constitutionalism. This means not merely the rule of law and an independent judiciary, but also vigorous action to encourage the free market economy and open investment. At the same time American democracy has weakened liberty by unwise congressional reform leading to lobbyists while plebiscites and initiatives have paralysed local government.

It is nice to have Zakaria admit, after decades of Republican cant against elites, that it is really conservative economists who would like to form an elite protected from public scrutiny and debate. But otherwise this is a shallow book. For a start, Zakaria is a remarkably sloppy writer. Thessalonica is a city, not a tribe, and the vicious massacre that he cites occurred there, not in Milan. The National Assembly is confused with the Revolutionary Convention. The final deal between Clinton and Arafat is dated well into Bush's presidency, while the last Mexican presidential election is placed in the wrong year. Disraeli's support for the Second Reform Act is placed in 1882, after he had already died. "The masses, Bismarck believed, would always vote for the pro-monarchial conservatives. He was right." No, he was wrong: soon majorities voted for Socialists, Catholics and Liberals. Zakaria has Saddam Hussein using biological weapons against his own citizens, when he clearly means chemical weapons. At other times Zakaria is simply tendentious. In trying to present a relatively favourable picture of Islam as a whole, he notes that the four largest Islamic countries, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, have all elected female presidents or prime ministers. He neglects to add that they were all elected because they were the closest relatives of leading male statesman. Much of his discussion of the origins of democracy is conventional guff about the rise of the Catholic Church, the Reformation, the success of Britain, while the Third French Republic gets only a sentence.

More serious are the limitations of Zakaria's picture. He notes how successful liberal democracy has been after military pro-market dictators in Chile, South Korea and Taiwan. He forgets that Chile was a successful liberal democracy for decades before Pinochet overthrew it in 1973, and that Sri Lanka has, despite a brutal civil war, been both more democratic and more liberal than South Korea. Certainly the Germany of Bismarck, von Bulow and Bethmann-Hollweg was more liberal, more democratic and arguably even more capitalist than the South Korea of Colonel Park. He credits South Korea's progress to its attachment to the market and ignores the special hothouse conditions of the cold war that encouraged its rise (Japanese investment diverted there from a blockaded China, more American aid than given to all of Africa for a start. He never asks what the "liberal" consensus of "The New Republic" and "The National Review" has done to deserve Arab support, or, after their support of Yeltsin, Russian support. Often Zakaria pines for a prosperous middle class, which will bring democracy. Yes, I remember how we were all inspired in 1980 when the Communist regime in Poland was brought to its knees by the strike of Gdansk shipyard's middle management. Likewise, COSATU did far more to encourage South African democracy than Paton or Oppenheimer, and one can make the same statement for South Korea, Brazil and much of the rest of the world.

Zakaria blames many of the United States' current problems on excessive democracy. He blames primaries for destroying the old party elites, but that did not stop them from ensuring the nomination of Bush I, Clinton, Dole, Gore and Bush II. He ignores the fact that many of the "democratic" reforms he blames are actually "liberal" ones, such as The Independent Counsel Act and initiatives against raising taxes (a model Hayekian measure). Zakaria comments about media vulgarity, but he ignores signs of media concentration and the oligarchic Telecommunications Act. He blames California's problems on excessively democratic machinery, and not on a ruthless well-organized elite that benefits from an electorate skewed against California's large Hispanic minority. One would better off reading Mike Davis' "City of Quartz" and "Dead Cities." Likewise one would be better off reading Lizabeth Cohen on credit cards and Deborah Rhode's "In the Interests of Justice," rather than blaming "democracy" for the fall of legal integrity. His vision of democracy says nothing about free trade unions, gender equality, social welfare or diversity of public opinion. And while he might want Alan Greenspan to be Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board For Life, what do the rest of us do if the economy should ever sink? At the end he twists Woodrow Wilson's famous statement of "making democracy safe for the world." Or for capitalism. Or for the Republican Party. Whichever is easier, and more profitable.


Elitists Will Love It!   April 22, 2003
 89 out of 121 found this review helpful

First of all Zakaria puts words together well. His use of the English language is beautiful, making this book a pleasure to read. However, I have some very real concerns with this book. When Peter Jennings says this book, "...is important for all Americans and those who would make American policy" I have reason for concern. Actually, there are very specific reasons why I'm troubled by this book. Let me tell you why.

1. Zakaria is correct; today we judge the value of every idea, institution, and individual by one test: is it popular? Leaders who are daily blown by winds of change cannot focus on long-term objectives. However, leaders who bend to whimsical political pressure are not practicing `democracy' - nobody's casting votes here - they're simply demonstrating how little backbone they have.

2. I do agree with Zakaria that democracy is not `inherently' good. I disagree with him on why this is. Democracy is very similar to freedom, and freedom itself is not `inherently' good. Why?...because freedom can be used for both good and evil. Free will creates an opportunity to choose that which is not good. Democracy does that same thing. A person can vote for a good leader, or a person can vote for a bad leader - the institution of democracy makes no distinction.

3. Zakaria believes that democracy `needs strong limits' to function properly. No, I would suggest that democracy `needs good people' to function properly. See, this is an important difference - and it's not a very politically correct statement. However, a democracy of thieves and robbers will result in leaders and laws that reflect the values of criminals. I believe that's self-evident.

4. Zakaria brings up the example of 1933 Germany electing the Nazis to power. Instead of denouncing the voter's inability to wisely discern, Zakaria blames democracy itself. He joins the ranks of the `blame democracy first crowd'. Regarding 1933 Germany, democracy was merely the tool. The tool was not broken - it's the user! This was a prime case of `user error'.

5. Here's the fundamental problem with Zakaria's book. Instead of starting at the grass-roots and explaining the essential importance of educating people in both knowledge and morality, Zakaria questions if democracy is the best governmental option. This is a critical mistake.

6. I'm not saying the democracy will work at any time at any place. I'm not naive about that. However, I am willing to say why it won't work at any time and any place, and the answer has nothing to do with democracy and everything to do with a people group's values. Not all values are equal. Not all values are good. Not all values are equally conducive to democracy.

7. Alexis de Tocqueville said, "America is great because she is good, and if America ever ceases to be good, America will cease to be great." This could be said about any democracy, anywhere in the world. A democracy devoid or morals is chaos. I wish Zakaria recognized this and encouraged a means for a better - aka `good' populous - rather than deriding democracy itself.

8. We do not live in a perfect world, and there are no perfect forms of government. Winston Churchill's famous quote is good to remember, "Democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." It is the least of all evils. Yes, there is a downside to democracy, but there is nothing better. Zakaria's push for an elitist government - a country run by the few - is not only a bad option, it is a disastrous one that fails to consider the nature of the human condition.